HUMINT

Human intelligence is derived from human sources. To the public, HUMINT remains synonymous with espionage and clandestine activities, yet, in reality, most HUMINT collection is performed by overt collectors such as diplomats and military attaches.

HUMINT is the oldest method for collecting information, and until the technical revolution of the mid to late twentieth century, it was the primary source of intelligence. HUMINT is used mainly by the CIA, the Department of State, the DoD, and the FBI.

Collection includes clandestine acquisition of photography, documents, and other material; overt collection by personnel in diplomatic and consular posts; debriefing of foreign nationals and US citizens who travel abroad; and official contacts with foreign governments.

The National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center is responsible for providing guidance for HUMINT activities, which are reflected in the National HUMINT Collection Directive. As part of this national effort, all HUMINT collection within the DoD is managed by the Defense HUMINT Service, under the direction of DIA’s Directorate for Operations. 국가 인적정보수집 지시서에 반영되어 있는 인적정보활동 에 대한 지침 마련 .제공.

국방성 HUMINT 활동- 국방정보부 작전본부 지시 하에 국방인적정보부에서 통합 관리

In 1992, he established the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center, an interagency organization that works with policymakers and the military to determine and write intelligence requirements and then assigns those requirements for intelligence collection to U.S. government agencies

1992년 NHRTC 설립
인적 정보 소요를 판단,결정 작성하고 이를 수집 부문에 지시. 배당
November 5, 2001 Vol. 91, No. 8

In 1992, the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center was created to coordinate both overt and clandestine HUMINT collection across the Intelligence Community. The Deputy Director of Operations at the CIA is the manager for HUMINT

Fortunately, in the National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC), set up in 1992 under the direction of the deputy Director for Operations (DDO) in his role as the National HUMINT Collection Manager, clandestine operations
undergo the most rigorous, formal requirements vetting process in
the community. (See the IC21 Intelligence Requirements Process staff study for further details.)

NHTRC- 수집 소요 점검. 심사 과정 변화

The NHRTC measures requirements by importance and allocates them to the most appropriate, least risky collection mechanism available./9/

각 (인적정보)소요를 중요도에 따라 판단하여 이를 가장 적합하고 위험부담이 적은 정보 수집가용 체계에 분배

The rule of thumb is that clandestine capabilities are to be tasked with a requirement only when these capabilities are uniquely able to satisfy them and the requirement rises to a level justifying the risks that would be
entailed. The CS seems to have in place already much of the
requirements management process that the CS of the future will
need.
비밀활동으로만 그 수요를 총족시킬 수 있으며 비밀수집에 따르는 위험부담 감수를 정당화 시킬 수 있을 만한 수준의 소요에 대해서만 비밀정보수집에 대한 임무가 부여

The Central Intelligence Agency is composed of four directorates: Administration, Science and Technology, Intelligence, and Operations. Several branches within the Directorate of Operations (DO) have responsibilities pertinent to human collection.

The National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center (NHRTC), established in 1992, reviews all intelligence requests requiring HUMINT to determine whether human collection is uniquely capable of collecting the desired information.

모든 인적정보 수집 소요를 검토 심사하여 휴민트 수집을 요구하는 정보 소요가 휴민트에 의해서만 수집가능한 것인가를 수 있는 가 여부를 판단

The Office of Military Affairs, also created in 1992, is charged with improving the quality and responsiveness of HUMINT to military requests.

The Foreign Intelligence Staff works to establish the authenticity of sources and information, aids the NHRTC in screening HUMINT requirements, and reviews the budget requirements of HUMINT projects.

대외정보관리국은 정보와 그 원천의 신빙성을 판별하고 인적정보소요를 걸러냄줌으로써 NHRTC를 지원하며 휴민트 계획의 예산 소요를 심사

Finally, the National Resources Division recruits foreign citizens residing in the United States to aid CIA initiatives in their native countries.
Once the human collection requirements are tasked, responsibility for managing the logistics and implementation falls to the appropriate area division. The six area divisions oversee operations in Central Eurasia, Latin America, Europe, East Asia, Africa, and the Near East.

The Central Intelligence Agency defines the "intelligence cycle" as the process by which information is acquired, converted into intelligence, and made available to policymakers. The five phases of the intelligence cycle include planning and direction, collection, processing, production and analysis, and dissemination. The first phase, planning and direction, is also known as "tasking". The process of tasking involves targeting the specific information to be gathered and determining which agencies and/or methods should be employed to carry out the assignment.

The Director of Intelligence (DDI), the top analyst in the CIA, is considered the original "point man" for intelligence requests from policy makers. The DDI plays a major role in every stage of the intelligence cycle, coordinating the needs of policy-makers with the collection capabilities of the Intelligence Community. However, when the determination is made that a human mode of collection is required to produce the desired information, jurisdiction shifts from the DDI to the Director of Operations (DDO).

정책결정자들의 정보소요에 대한 일차적 도달지는 정보본부
정보본부는 정보 순환의 매 단계에서 중요한 역할을 수행하고 있으며 정책결자들의 정보소요를 수집역량에 맞추어 조율함. 단 일단 정보수집이 인적 양태로 결정되면 이 문제는 작전본부 소관으로 넘어감.

Historically, there are three major difficulties with intelligence requests from policymakers. The first, as Glenn Hastedt notes, is that policy makers "often treat intelligence as a free good". Many intelligence consumers are ignorant of the costs associated with collection and the limited resources available to provide intelligence. Satisfying some of the more obscure requests from policymakers would require enormous overhead costs to establish or re-tool an entire human intelligence network. Secondly, policymakers assume, as Hastedt reiterates, "that it [intelligence] is something which can be accessed at any time, and turned on and off in accordance with the policy-makers' interest in a problem". Finally, items on the intelligence wish lists of policymakers are often couched in such broad terms that it is difficult to narrow the scope of their requests into a single task or project feasible enough to be accomplished. A Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee may ask for a brief on the military capabilities of Iran. Of course, a request in these terms is impossible to satisfy. Is the senator referring to conventional or unconventional military capabilities? The time reference is unspecified: Does the senator mean at this moment, or an estimate looking one, two, five, or ten years into the future? Given the impracticality of scouring the country for weapons, is the senator concerned with developments on a specific border, or with reference to a specific conflict? Often, as it turns out, the intelligence consumers themselves are uncertain of exactly what information they desire.

In order to relieve the considerable burdens on the human collection system, the DDO in his capacity as the National HUMINT Collection Manager established the NHRTC in 1992. When requirements for human collection are levied by intelligence consumers, the NHRTC allocates the job to the "most appropriate, least risky collection mechanism available". The NHRTC is responsible at all times for being aware of the information available through open-source and other less risky methods of collection, in order to verify that HUMINT is uniquely able to satisfy the intelligence requirement and that the risk entailed in gathering the information is justifiable.

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