Spook Mountain: By Wendell Minnick Asia Times, March 6 2003
TAIPEI - The United States and Taiwan have a cooperative intelligence-sharing agreement that allows both the US National Security Agency (NSA) and Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB) to listen in on mainland Chinese military communications in both the Nanjing and Guangzhou military regions. With the assistance of the NSA, Taiwan has constructed a signal intelligence (SIGINT) base at Pingtung Lee on Yangmingshan Mountain just north of Taipei, which has been operating for at least 15 years. 미국과 대만은 정보 교환 협정을 맺어 미 국가안보국 NSA와 대만의 국가안전국은 합동으로 난징과 광조우 군구의 중국 군사 통신을 감청할 수 있게 되었다. NSA의 지원으로 대만은 타이페이 북쪽의 양밍산의 핑퉁 리에 신호정보 기지를 건설헀으며 이는 적어도 15년동안 운영되어 왔다.
The fact that it is a US operation in a country with which it has no diplomatic ties requires some examination. First, Taiwan's geographic proximity to China makes it the first choice for stationing a SIGINT base. 미국이 공식적 외교관계를 맺지 않은 국가에서 활동한다는 사실은 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 첫쨰로 대만의 중국에 대한 지리적 인접성으로 인하여 SIGINT 기지를 두는 데 있어 첫 번째 선택지가 되었다.
Second, Taiwan is pro-US and shares a mutual fear of Chinese military expansionism. Third, Taiwan needs an indications and warning (I&W) system that prevents China from launching a surprise attack. 둘 쨰로 대만은 친미적이며 또 한 중국의 군사력 팽창에 대하여 (미국과 ) 같은 우려를 공유하고 있다. 세 번째로 대만은 중국의 기습공격을 방지할 징후 경보 체계를 필요로 한다.
First reported by Jane's Defence Weekly this January, the facility now appears to have grown more ears. Shortly after the recent Jane's report, additional antennas were located by Asia Times Online on Wunjian Mountain near Dazhi just south of Pingtung Lee. Atol has interviewed a former NSA official who once worked at Pingtung Lee. 올 1월 簡氏防務週刊(JDW)에 처음 보도된 이 시설은 지금 더 규모가 확대된 것으로 보인다. 최근 簡지 보도 이후 핑퉁 리 바로 남쪽의 다즈 부근의 원지엔 산에 추가로 안테나가 설치된 것이 아시아 타임지 온라인에 포착되었다. 아톨(아마 기자 이름으로 추정 뭔 맥락이 없으니)은 핑퉁 리에서 근무한 적이 있던 한 전직 NSA 관리를 인터뷰했다.
The former NSA official told Atol: "It is a classified NSA operation. It is known within the NSA as the SIGINT Liaison Branch [SLB]. The reason it is so hush-hush, besides the fact that NSA operations are always classified, is that NSA is an official US government agency, and we are not supposed to have any official representation on Taiwan." 이 전직 NSA 관리는 다음과 같이 말헀다. 이 것은 극비로 분류된 NSA 작전이었다. NSA내에서는 신호 정보 연락 부문으로 알려졌다. 이 것이 그토록 기밀사항이었던 이유는 NSA 활동은 늘 기밀로 분류된다는 것 외에도 NSA는 미국 정부 기관이므로 우리가 대만에 공식적으로 어떤 기구도 둘 수 없었기 떄문이었다.
The facility provides Taiwan the necessary edge to prevent the People's Republic of China (PRC) from winning a decisive battle quickly. Data processing from the facility enables Taiwan to appraise China's current threat status. Information provided includes details of China's armed forces, their structure and organization, tactical doctrine, order of battle, weapons and equipment, and supporting battlefield functional systems. This includes how the PRC operates in accordance to its doctrine and training. 이 시설은 중화인민공화국이 속전으로 승리하는 걸 방지하는 데 필요한 우위를 대만에게 제공하였다. 기지로부터 나오는 데이터 처리로 대만은 중국의 현재 위협 상태를 평가할 수 있엇다. 제공된 정보에는 중국군, 전력 구조와 조직 ,전술 교리 ,전투서열, 무기 및 장비 그리고 전장을 지원하는 기능 체제 등에 대한 세부내역에 포함되어 있었다. 여기에는 중국군이 자신들의 교의와 훈련에 맞추어 어떻게 작전하는 지에 대한 내용도 포함되었다.
Of special concern are the activities of the Second Artillery Corps, which has the capability of unleashing up to 400 Dong Feng-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) tactical ballistic missiles in multiple-wave and multidirectional
saturation strikes on Taiwan. Intelligence gathered by the facility provides options for Taiwan's leaders to interdict and defeat China's military by maneuver or attack. Taiwan's goal is not necessarily to inflict serious harm on the mainland with the use of offensive weapons currently in its arsenal and those in development, but to force China to abandon its attack, or compel the United States to enter the conflict. 특별히 관심을 기울였던 것 중에 제2포병의 동향이 있었는 데 이 부대는 동펑 11과 15 전술탄도탄을 4백기까지 발사하여 대만에 대하여 다방향에 제파 공격을 집중적으로 퍼부을 수 있었다. 이 시설이 수집한 정보는 대만 지도자들이 중국의 군사 기동이나 공격을 저지하고 패퇴시킬 수 있는 선택안을 제공했다. 대만의 목표는 꼭 현재 보유 중이거나 혹은 개발 중인 공격 무기를 사용하여 본토에 심각한 피해를 주는 것일 필요는 없고 중국이 공격을 단념토록 하거나 미국이 분쟁에 개입하도록 끌어들이는 것이다.
In a war, China would first attempt a "decapitation strategy" that would include missile and air-force assaults on key military installations and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I). Pingtung Lee would no doubt be the first site hit. Taiwan and mainland China are separated by the Taiwan Strait, which is 72 nautical miles at its closest point and 140 nautical miles at its farthest point. Chinese warplanes can reach Taiwan in just seven minutes and Chinese warships in about five hours. 전쟁 발발시 중국은 먼저 단두전략을 시도할 것이며 여기에는 (대만의) 핵심 군사 시설과 C4I시설에 대한 공습 및 미사일 공격이 들어있다. 핑퉁 리는 의심할 바 없이 첫번째 타격대상이다. 대만과 중국 본토는 대만 해협으로 분리되어 있는 데 이는 가장 가까운 곳은 72해리 가장 먼 곳은 140해리이다. 중국 군용기는 7분이면 대만에 도달할 수 있고 함선은 5시간 안에 도달할 수 있다.
The Pingtung Lee site has 10 antenna masts, of which six are high-frequency (HF) dipole antennas in a circular pattern called a "six element" or "fix-six" arrangement that performs both interception and direction-finding (DF) tasks. This type of HF-DF antenna configuration allows Taiwan and the US to monitor China's military radio ommunications. There is one radome on he base, installed in early 1998, that allows the NSA to uplink data back o the US for further processing. Prior to that, all SLB communications went hrough a nearby commercial satellite dish facility belonging Chunghwa Telecom. The antenna complex located by Atol on Wunjian Mountain near Dazhi has the same "fix-six" configuration, with an additional collection of several microwaves nearby.
핑퉁 리 기지에는 10개의 안테나 마스크가 있고 이 중 6개는 고주파(HF) 딥홀 안테나들로 "6 엘레멘트(six element)" 혹은 " 6 고정식? (fix-six)"배열로 불리워지는 방식으로 원형 배열되어 있으며 통신 감청과 방향 탐지(DF) 임무를 수행한다. 이 종류의 안테나 구성은 대만과 미국이 중국의 군용 무선 통신을 모니터할 수 있게 한다. 이 기지에는 레이돔이 있는 데 이는 1998년에 설치되었으며 이로 인해 NSA는 추가적 처리를 위해 데이터를 미국으로 올려보낼 수 있다. 이 이전에는 모든 SIGINT 연락 부문 통신은 청화 텔레콤에 속해있는 근처의 민용 통신 위성 시설을 거쳤다. 아톨이 위치를 찾아낸 원지엔 산의 안테나 구성체도 동일한 "고정식 6(fix-six)" 배열 구성으로 되어 있으며 추가적으로는 근처에 몇몇 마이크로 웨이브 안테나들이 집합해 있다
Pingtung Lee is maintained with the support of Summit Telecom Systems (STS), a US commercial company based in Maryland, which conducts operations in Japan, South Korea and the Azores as one of the numerous "caretaker" companies the NSA uses to maintain SIGINT sites around the world. The NSA source told Atol: "Civilian personnel are there only in a support role. They man the communications center and maintain the communications equipment, and the station computers."
핑통 리는 서미트 텔레콤 시스템의 지원으로 유지되고 있고 메릴랜드에 본거지를 둔 이 미국 기업은 일본 한국 그리고 아조레스에서도 활동하고 있으며 NSA가 전 세계에 걸친 SIGINT 기지들을 유지하기 위하여 이용하는 여러 "관리 유지" 회사 중 하나이다. 이 NSA 관리는 이렇게 말헀다. "민간인은 오로지 지원 부문에만 있습니다. 이들은 통신 센터에 배치되며 통신 장비와 기지 컴퓨터들을 정비 유지합니다."
One STS employee who served as "senior liaison" with the Taiwanese government between 1995 and 2000 has provided material describing the technical aspects of the operation. According to the information, the base
operates "a variety of special-purpose telecommunication and data-processing systems".
1995년에서 2000년까지 대만 정부와의 "고위 연락관"으로 근무했던 한 STS 직원은 이 활동의 기술적 측면을 묘사하는 자료를 제공해주었다. 이 정보에 따르면 이 기지는 "다양한 특수 목적 통신. 데이터 처리 시스템"을 운용하고 있다.
>From 1995-2000 the NSA initiated a major upgrade and modernization program that "identified weaknesses in systems architecture, then designed a large-scale multi-year modernization program which integrated significant new processing capabilities and provided a tenfold increase in overall system capacity. [It] implemented web-based technology as a cost-effective replacement for dated software processes. Information that used to require hours or days to process and report can now be processed and reported in less than a minute," the STS source said. 1995년부터 2000년에 걸쳐 NSA는 대규모의 업그레이드 .현대화 프로그램을 실시하여 시스템 아키텍쳐의 취약성을 파악하고 수년 간에 걸친 대규모의 현대화 프로그램을 입안하였다. 이는 중대한 신형 데이터 처리 역량을 통합하고 시스템의 전체적 성능을 10배로 향상시켰다. 구식의 소프트 웨어를 대체하여 비용대 효울 면에서 우수한 웹 기반 기술이 이용되었다. 과거에는 정보를 처리해서 보고하는 데 수 시간 혹은 수일이 필요했던 정보가 이제는 1분도 안 되어서 처리되고 보고될 수 있다고 이 STS 소식통은 말헀다
The NSA also improved training and development programs for Taiwanese running the facility. This endeavor led the Taiwanese to be "more self-sufficient and less reliant on external assistance". This shift of authority and responsibility "enabled US staff to focus on broader strategic initiatives and has allowed absorption of a fivefold increase in the number of supported systems with no increase in staffing".
NSA는 또 한 이 시설을 운용하는 대만인들에게 훈련 개발프로그램을 제공헀다. 이러한 노력으로 대만인들은 보다 자기 충족적으로 되어 외부의 원조에 덜 의존하게 되었다. 이러한 권한과 책임의 이임으로 미국 측 인원은 보다 광범위한 전략적 구상에 집중할 수 있게 되었고 인원의 증대없이 다섯배로 늘어난 지원 시스템을 흡수할 수 있었다
According to the STS source, the NSA initiated and designed a major information-technology (IT) upgrade "which provided [a] 100-fold increase in server capacity and replaced old LAN [local area network] technology with a high-speed ATM [asynchronous transfer mode] network ... simplifying IT architecture and eliminating use of non-standard proprietary technology in favor of standardized commercial solutions. [It] mitigated [the] risk of data loss by instituting off-site backup for critical data and by redesigning system architecture to provide redundant systems at single points of failure."
이 STS 소식통에 따르면 NSA는 대규모의 정보 기술 IT 업그레이드를 실시하고 입안하였으며 이는 서버 용량을 100배 향상시키고 구식의 랜 기술을 고속의 네트워크로 대체하였으며 아키텍쳐를 간소화하고 비표준적 자체 기술(non-standard proprietary technology)을 사용을 그만두고 대신 표준화된 상용 솔류션을 도입했다. 이 계획은 핵심 데이터에 대한 오프 사이트 백업을 제도화하고 "Single Point of Failure"들에 대한 리번던시 시스쳄을 제공할 수 있도록 시스템 아키텍쳐를 재셀계 하므로써 데이타 손실의 위험을 감소시켰다
The former NSA source elaborated on the role the station played in US intelligence-gathering on China. The source stated that the NSA has "helped the Taiwanese effort tremendously by providing them with equipment systems, specialized software, and teaching them a lot of analytical techniques. The relationship is extremely important to the US also, because of the growing threat of the Chinese, and the fact that Taiwan has the Chinese-language capability while we have so little. A very large percentage of what the NSA obtains about the Chinese comes from the Taiwanese operations."
전 NSA 소식통은 이 기지가 미국의 대중 정보수집에 있어 수행하는역할에 대해 보다 자세히 설명헀다. 이 소식통은 NSA는 장비 체게와 특성화된 소프트웨어를 제공하고 이들에게 많은 분석 기법을 가르피므로써 대만을 엄청나게 도왔다. 이 관계는 미국에 있어서도 극히 중요한 데 이는 계속 점증하는 중국의 위협 떄문이며 NSA 에 중국어 능력이 거의 없는 반면에 대만은 이 걸 가지고 있다는 사실 떄문이다. NSA가 중국에 대해여 얻어낸 정보 중 많은 비율이 이 대만 활동에서 나온다
When SIGINT operations in Hong Kong had to relocate because of the impending 1997 handover to China, responsibilities were divided between facilities in Taiwan and Australia. Hong Kong's Stanley Fort Satellite Station, code-named "Project Kittiwake", at Chung Hom Kok was moved to Australia in 1993 and placed under that country's Defense Signals Directorate at Geraldton, Western Australia. The Chung Hom Kok station monitored Chinese satellite communications; telemetry from Chinese ballistic missile tests, and satellite launches; mission data from intelligence satellites, which included both electronic intelligence and photographic intelligence satellites; and domestic telecommunications downlinked from China's geostationary satellites.
1997년 본토 인도가 임박해오자 홍콩의 SIGINT operations들은 재배치되어야 헀고 그 책임은 대만과 호주의 시설들에게 분담되었다. 프로젝트 키티웨이크Project Kittiwake라는 암호명을 가진 홍콩 청혹콕의 스탠리 포트 위성 기지는 93년 호주로 옮겨서 서부 제랄턴에 있는 호주 국방 신호 본부 하에 들어갔다. 이 청홍콕 기지는 중국 위성 통신 중국 탄도탄 시험에서 오는 텔레메트리 ,위성 발사, 전자정보위성과 사진 위성을 포함한 정보 위성에서 전송된 데이타 ,그리고 중국의 정지위성에서 다운링크된 국내 통신들을 모니터 했다.
Radio interception tasks at the former HF aerial farm at Tai Mo Shan, New Territories, Hong Kong, was closed and transferred to Pingtung Lee, Taiwan. With this, Taiwan joined an interconnected network of HF SIGINT operations that include Kikai-jima, Japan, with a similar "fix-six" HF-DF antenna system, and Khon Kaen, Thailand. Geographically, Taiwan is in an excellent position to assist. Without Taiwan's coverage, the US SIGINT picture of mainland China would be critically deficient for the US intelligence community.
신계 타이 모산의 이전 HF 에어리얼 팜(aerial farm) 에서 하던 전파 감청 임무는 문을 닫고 필퉁리로 옮겨졋다. 이와 함께 대만은 국제적 HF SIGINT 작전 네트워크에 들어갔는데 여기에는 유사한 "6 고정(fix-six)"HF-DF(방향탐지) 방식으로 배열된 안테나군을 운영하는 일본 키카이지마, 태국의 콘 카엔이 포함되어 있다. 지리적으로 대만은 원조하기에 훌륭한 위치에 있다. 대만이 커버해주지 않으면 중국 대륙에 미국의 SIGINT 상은 미국의 정보 공동체에 있어 결정적인 결함을 겪을 것이다.
Transferring SIGINT responsibilities from one country to another is not difficult. The UK-USA Security Agreement, signed in 1947, divided SIGINT collection responsibilities between the United States and the United Kingdom (including Commonwealth members Australia, New Zealand and Canada). This was done to prevent duplication and to maximize collection capabilities. The US facility at Pingtung Lee falls under the responsibility of the NSA. Therefore, data collected on China must be shared not only with the Taiwanese, but also with US SIGINT partners, according to the agreement.
SIGINT능력을 한 나라에서 다른 나라로 이전하는 것은 어려운 일이 아니다. 1947년 에 조인된 미 영 안보 협정은 미국과 영국 (영 연방 구성원인 호주 뉴질랜드도 포함하여)사이의 수집 책임을 분담했다.이는 중복을 방지하고 수집 역량을 최대화하기 위하여 행해졌다. 핑통 리의 미국 시설은 NSA 의 책임으로 떨어졌다. 그러므로 이 협정에 따르면 중국에 대한 데이타는 대만 뿐 아니라 다른 미국 파트너와도 공유되어야 한다
The United States and the Republic of China (ROC) have had a SIGINT relationship since World War II, when the US helped the Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) government in China fight the Japanese occupation. That rapport continued after the Nationalists escaped to the island of Taiwan in 1949 to avoid being destroyed by communist forces.
미국과 중화민국은 미국이 국민당 정부가 일본 점령에 맞서 싸우던 2차 대전 이래부터 SIGINT관계를 맺어왔다. 이러한 친밀한 관계는 국민당이 공산군을 피해 대만으로 달아난 뒤에도 게속되었다.
US intelligence op erations in Taiwan were impressive during the Cold War.The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) based its now-famous Air America, Civil Air Transport and Air Asia transport operations in Taiwan. The CIA's Western Enterprises operation to invade China from bases in Burma (now Myanmar) was also headquartered there.
냉전 시기 대만에서의 미국 정보활동은 인상적이었다. CIA는 이제는 널리 아려진 에어 아메리카 , 시빌 에어 트랜스포트, 에어 아시아 항공사 활동을 대만을 무대로 하여 전개헀다. 버마(현재는 미얀마)의 기지에서 중국을 침범했던 웨스턴 엔터프라이즈 활동 역시 대만에 본거지를 두었다
During the Cold War SIGINT stations were constructed all over Taiwan. US and ROC intelligence and military personnel manned these outposts and a limited amount of data were shared with the ROC government. US SIGINT operations in Taiwan gave the US crucial data on the Vietnam War and activities in mainland China.
냉전 동안 대만 전역에 SIGINT 기지가 건설되었다. 이 기지에는 미국과 중화민국 정보 군사 인원들이 배치되었고 제한된 량의 데이타는 대만 정부와 공유되었다. 대만에서의 미국 활동은 베트남 전과 대륙내 활동에 대한 핵심적인 데이터를 제공했다
Cooperative US-ROC SIGINT operations throughout the Cold War consisted of the US Naval Security Group Activity, USN-21, in Taipei; US Air Force Security Service Office, Air Task Force-13 in Taipei; 327th Communications Reconnaissance Company, US Army Security Agency, Nan Szu Pu, near Kaohsiung; US Naval Auxiliary Communications Center under the direction of the CIA; and U-2s equipped with both photographic and SIGINT equipment flown by Taiwanese pilots.
냉전 시기 미국 중화민국 간 SIGINT 협력은 타이페이의 해군 보안단 활동대 USN-21 , 타이페이의 공군 보안국 사무소 공군 태스크 포스 13(Air Task Force-13 ) , 가오슝 부근의 난주푸에 있던 육군 보안국의 327 정찰 중대, CIA 지휘 하에 있던 미 해군 보조 통신 센터 그리고 대만인 조종사들이 몰았던 사진 정찰 장치와 SIGINT장치를 갖춘 U-2 기들로 구성되었었다
As the Vietnam War began to unwind in the early 1970s, US military activities in Taiwan began to fold. From 1972-73 the United States closed all SIGINT facilities except the US Air Force (USAF) Security Service Support Base, 6987th Security Group, at Linkou, just 10 kilometers northwest of Taipei. It remained under US military control until 1977.
1970년 초 베트남전이 풀려가기 시작하자 대만 내 미국 군사 활동도 오그라 들기 시작했다. 72년에서 73년동안 미국은 타이페이 북서부로 10킬로미터 떨어진 린코우에 있던 공군 보안국 지원기지 6987 보안 전대를 제외하고 모든 시설을 페쇄했다. 이기는 1977년까지 미군 당국하에 남아 있었다.
After US president Jimmy Carter declared "normalized" relations with the People's Republic of China in December 1978, all formal US government organizations in Taiwan were privatized. The US Embassy was renamed the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in March 1979. The US government turned over the remaining US intelligence and military operations to Taiwan or they became covert enterprises using nationals as cover.
1978년 12월 지미 카터 미국 대통령이 중화인민공화국과의 관계를 "정상화" 하겠다고 선언하자 대만에 있던 모든 미국 정부 조직들은 민간단체화 되었다. 미국 대사관은 79년 3월 미국 대만협회(American Institute in Taiwan)로 개칭했다. 미국 정부는 남아 있던 미국 정보 군사 활동을 대만에 넘겨주거나 이들은 가장 국적을 이용하는 비밀 사업체가 되었다
According to a former USAF technician who worked at Linkou until 1985 as a civilian contract worker for the ROC military, the facility was still active at that time. The Linkou facility was moved to Yangmingshan some time after 1985.
1985년까지 민간인 계약자로 대만군을 위해 린코우에서 근무헀던 한 전직 미 공군 기술자에 따르면 이 시설은 그 때까지도 운용되었다고 하였다.1985년 이 후 이 린코우 기지는 양밍산으로 이전되었다.
The time and transition from Linkou to Yangmingshan is unclear, but what is clear is that Pingtung Lee places
Taiwan in a critical role for US intelligence and regional security interests. If the United States should lose Taiwan in either a forced or voluntary "reunification" it would upset US intelligence gathering, processing and capabilities, and thus greatly endanger regional security. For this reason, democracy or no democracy, the US position in its pledge to defend Taiwan against PRC aggression must be seen in a different light. Taiwan can no longer be dismissed by the United States as expendable, but must be considered an active and pro-US partner in the regional security and stability of East Asia.
린코우에서 양밍산으로 옮겨난 시기는 불명확하지만 분명한 건 핑퉁 리가 대만을 미국 정보 지역안보적 이익에 있어 핵심적 역할로 올려놓았다는 점이다. 만약 미국이 강요된 혹은 "자발적인" 통일로 대만을 잃는다면 이는 미국 정보 수집 처리 역량을 뒤집어 놓을 것이고 고로 지역 안보 일반을 심각하게 위해할 것이다. 이 때문에 민주적이든 민주적이지 않든 대만을 중국의 침공에서 방어한다는 공약에 있어 미국의 입장은 다른 각도로 비추어 보아야 한다. 미국은 더 이상 대만을 버릴 수 있는 것으로 생각할 수 없고 동부 아시아의 지역 안보와 안정에 있어 능동적이고 친미적인 파트너로 여겨야 한다..
캐나다 통신보안국
CHINA AND CUBA AND INFORMATION WARFARE (IW) Challenge to Update Taiwan's SIGINT
By Wendell Minnick
Jane’s Intelligence Review, Feb. 1, 2004
Taiwan is facing new challenges in upgrading its signals intelligence (SIGINT) as China continues to improve its communications systems.
Despite lengthy covert technical support provided by the US National Security Agency (NSA), Taiwan still lacks a 3-D surveillance picture of China's military activities and operations.
A US intelligence source with intimate knowledge of Taiwan's SIGINT operations has told JIR that Taiwan's older methods of collecting and analysing radio transmissions, which are mostly manual and very time consuming, are unable to keep pace with modern signals.
"For many years signals have steadily become faster, bigger (many carried within one signal), and much more complex," he said. "Newer methods employ computerised collection systems that detect, intercept, and process a signal, then output certain types of information. Some systems also have the capability to demodulate some types of signals and produce the messages being sent. These newer systems are larger and more complex than old collection systems, and much more expensive. The newer systems must be used to cope with the tremendous increase in the number and complexity of some of the communications systems now used by China."
The analysis of intercepted signals is undertaken by 369 officers (including 180 colonels and 189 lieutenants) working for Taiwan's Communications Development Office (CDO), a quasi-independent organisation under the National Security Bureau (NSB). "The collection positions located at intercept sites scattered around the island would be manned by enlisted operators," stated the source.
JIR has located only two SIGINT high frequency direction finder (HF-DF) antenna facilities in Taiwan - Pingdeng Li, operated by a joint CDO and NSA team on Yangmingshan Mountain, north of Taipei, and Dahzi, northeast of Taipei - but there are probably more.
With the help of coastal radar, Taiwan's SIGINT network can locate mainland Chinese ships and submarines using radio direction finding by homing in on the direction a signal is coming from. However, the intelligence source told JIR that Taiwan has "difficulty determining the location and movements of ground troops because most of the mainland transmissions are by fibre optics cable". For example, during China's 1996 military exercises, Taiwan was unable to track the movements of infantry units moving from Zhejiang to Fuqing in Fujian Province. "This is a major intelligence blind spot," he said.
According to the source, Taiwan's emerging intelligence collection problem centres on the frequency range that the target signals operate in, the propagation path of radio waves and the curvature of the earth.
Taiwan's older intercept equipment and antenna systems, which it used for many years, used to be capable of receiving target signals in the past because the signals were simpler - most operating in the high frequency (HF) range. However, most signals of interest today, including radar, operate in the upper very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency (UHF), and extremely high frequency (EHF) ranges.
Radio waves transmitted in these higher frequency ranges follow a 'line of sight' propagation path: a signal travels from the transmitting antenna straight towards the horizon. When it reaches the horizon, it continues to travel in a straight line out into space, while the surface of the Earth drops away due to its curvature.
Since Taiwan falls below that line of sight propagation path, it is unable to intercept the signals. This is part of the reason that Taiwan has difficulty in establishing an emitter identification database, which is needed in order to counter electronic warfare attacks."
Taiwan lacks an airborne SIGINT platform that can travel high enough to intercept these signals. In 2001, Taiwan submitted a letter of request to the USA for a SIGINT aircraft, and then in 2002 followed that up with a price and availability request. The USA responded with two possible options, Raytheon and Cessna. However, Taiwan has not continued with the acquisition. Priority issues and a debate regarding the utility of airborne SIGINT systems as opposed to ground-based SIGINT systems have stalled the purchase. JIR's source said: "Significant elements within Taiwan's air force were interested in these aircraft, but met with opposition from within the Ministry of National Defence, who were more in favour of procuring a medium transport aircraft. As a result, neither programme has gone through."
Taiwan does have one Lockheed Martin EC-130H 'Compass Call' electronic warfare aircraft '1351', which is operated by the Tien Gan (Airborne Countermeasure) team of the 20th Electronic Warfare Group. It transmits various types of emissions intended to block or interfere with China's command and control communications. Despite media speculation that the EC-130H is a 'spy plane', a Taiwan National Defence Committee report released in late 2003 stated: "The mission of this plane is to send out electronic interference during combat and it does not have the ability to intercept and process electronic signals."
Taiwan may have some other intercept options. The source said: "[Chinese] satellite communications are transmitted in these same UHF and EHF frequency ranges, using satellite dish antennas designed to radiate upward toward the satellite. Transmissions from the satellite back to earth follow the same line of site propagation path, but they can only be received by stations located within the footprint of the satellite." Therefore, if Taiwan or its outer islands fall inside that footprint, it could intercept these signals.
However, according to the source, it is "hard to determine mainland military posture, training exercises, and missile facilities from satellite photographs, due to the limited coverage of commercial satellites not under Taiwanese military control". Taiwan's military uses the Israeli EROS, US IKONOS, French SPOT and Canadian RADARSAT satellites. The source added: "There are not enough satellites, and they are commercially owned, not controlled by the military. This means that the period of using a satellite to collect military intelligence is short. That is because the geographical area of interest is in the satellite footprint only for a short time as the satellite passes over, and then is not available until the satellite passes over again on the next orbit."
Taiwan's ROCSAT-2 will help eliminate this problem. Tentatively scheduled for launch in early 2004 from Vandenberg air force base in California, the 750kg satellite will be a low earth orbit remote sensing platform that will circle the Earth 14 times per day (97.2 minutes per orbit). This will include two sweeps over Taiwan per day (one at night and one by day), at an altitude of 891km. Although the ROCSAT-2 is technically a scientific platform belonging to the National Space Program Office (NSPC), it has the capability to photograph objects larger than 2m, and the National Science Council has stated that if the need arises the military could use the satellite.
However, it is unclear what the level of precision (detection, recognition, identification, description, and technical intelligence) the ROCSAT-2 will have. The ROCSAT-2's imaging processing system, an integrated hardware and software system that handles remote sensing image data, is combined with a front-end X-band antenna to form a complete satellite-image data receiving and processing station.
Taiwan and the USA have been discussing the procurement of a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite for Taiwan. According to a US government source: "The procurement of a synthetic aperture radar satellite is highly encouraged by the US military." A SAR satellite would certainly increase Taiwan's coverage of the Taiwan Strait and of the interior of China. However, two major problems make such purchases difficult: Taiwan's decreasing defence budget and a growing public apathy towards expensive programmes.
cf.
CHINA SIGINT CAPABILITIES -- While attention focuses on the captured US Navy aircraft and its personnel, China's own electronic networks continue their work out-of-sight. The focus of China's electronic collection activities is on its immediate neighborhood. According to Professor Desmond Ball of the Australian National University, writing some ten years ago, "There are several dozen SIGINT ground stations deployed throughout China concerned with monitoring signals from Russia, Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia and India, as well as internal communications .... The two largest SIGINT stations are, first, the main Technical Department SIGINT net control station on the northwest outskirts of Beijing; and, second, a large complex near Lake Kinghathu in the extreme northeast corner of China."
Ground stations oriented toward Russia include those at Jilemutu and Jixi in the northeast, and at Erlian and Hami near the Mongolian border. Two sites in Xinjiang, at Qitai and Korla, are in a special category. These have reportedly been operated by China jointly with the US Central Intelligence Agency's Office of SIGINT Operations since the late 1980’s. These sites were originally tasked to monitor Soviet missile tests and space launches, but their current status is uncertain.
SIGINT operations covering India are controlled from a large station at Chengdu, supplemented by the nearby facility at Dayi and "numerous" smaller posts along the Indian border. A major complex at Kunming mainly covers Indochina, and most notably Vietnam. Other significant facilities are located near Shenyang, near Jinan and in Nanjing and Shanghai. Additional stations are in the Fujian and Guangdong military districts opposite Taiwan.
China has at least two major SIGINT facilities on Hainan: a large complex mainly monitoring signals activity in and around the South China Sea; and a ground station, together with decryption capabilities, for intercepting signals transmitted through US and Russian communication satellites. Ships and aircraft under the South Sea Fleet, headquartered at Zhanjiang immediately north of the island, supplement these to link with a far-reaching electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering system.
The Chinese network of ground stations is supplemented by "half a dozen ships, truck-mounted systems, airborne systems and a limited satellite collection capability," according to Professor Ball. Little is publicly known of China's airborne systems. Ball identified the four-turboprop EY-8, an indigenous development of the Russian An-12 'Cub,' as China's main ELINT and reconnaissance aircraft a decade ago. This role was subsequently assumed by at least four locally modified Tu-154Ms, which some analysts compare with the Il-20 ELINT aircraft deployed by Moscow in the 1980s. Naval SIGINT capabilities appear more extensive. At least eight such specialized ships were operational a decade ago, and their number has since grown to at least 10 intelligence-gathering auxiliary vessels.
To reiterate, the focus of China's electronic collection activities has been on its immediate neighbors. For example, US sources in Honolulu noted three years ago that Chinese submarines had never sought to mirror Soviet surveillance of US Pacific Command facilities in Hawaii. In the near future, however, China's SIGINT operations against US assets could well expand as the controversy about Taiwan brings US and Chinese interests in conflict. (Jonkers) (Jane's Defence Weekly 24 March 1999; // 'Signals Intelligence in China,' by Desmond Ball, Jane's Intelligence Review 1995; // Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 11, 2001 //R. Karniol).
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http://www.lanuevacuba.com/archivo/manuel-cereijo-125.htm CHINA AND CUBA AND INFORMATION WARFARE (IW) http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagmc156.phpBEJUCAL
